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Abstract
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the
form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers.
Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these
new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework
highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine
of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth in an inverse U-
shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we
characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We
show how optimal IPR policies affecting the cost of standardization vary with
the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other
parameters. Third, we show that the interplay between innovation and stan-
dardization may lead to multiple equilibria. Finally, we study the implications
of our model for the skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking
North-South trade to intellectual property rights protection.
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1 Introduction
The diffusion of new technologies is often coupled with standardization of product
and process innovations. New technologies, when first conceived and implemented,
are often complex and require skilled personnel to operate. At this stage, their use
in the economy is limited both by the patents of the innovator and the skills that
these technologies require. Their widespread adoption and use first necessitates the
tasks involved in these new technologies to become more routine and standardized,
ultimately enabling their cheaper production using lower-cost unskilled labor. How-
ever, such standardization not only expands output but also implies that the rents
accruing to innovators will come to an end. Therefore, the process of standardization
is both an engine of economic growth and a potential discouragement to innovation.
In this paper, we study this interplay between innovation and standardization.
The history of computing illustrates the salient patterns of this interplay. The
use of silicon chips combined with binary operations were the big breakthroughs,
starting the ICT revolution. During the first 30 years of their existence, computers
could only be used and produced by highly skilled workers. Only a lengthy process
of standardization made computers and silicon chips more widely available and more
systematically integrated into the production processes, to such a degree that today
computers and computer-assisted technologies are used at every stage of production
with workers of very different skill levels. At the same time that the simplification of
manufacturing processes allowed mass production of electronic devices and low prices,,
competition among ICT firms intensified enormously, first among few industry leaders
and then more broadly at a global scale.
In our model, new products are invented via costly R&D and can first be pro-
duced only by skilled workers. This innovation process is followed by a costly process
of standardization, whereby the previously new goods are adapted to be produced
using unskilled labor. 1 Free entry into standardization makes it a competing process;
standardization will be undertaken by newcomers, which may then displace incum-
bent producers. By shifting some technologies to low-skill workers, standardization
alleviates the pressure on scarce high-skill workers, thereby raising aggregate demand
This view has a clear antecedent in Nelson and Phelps (1966), which we discuss further below.
See also Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) on the comparative advantage of unskilled workers in
routine, or in our language "standardized," tasks. We can also interpret innovation as product
innovation and standardization as process innovation. Evidence that firms engaging in product
innovation (e.g., Cohen and Klepper, 1996) are smaller and more skill intensive than firms engaging
in process innovation is consistent with our assumptions.
and fostering incentives for further innovation. Yet, the anticipation of standardization
also reduces the potential profits from new products, discouraging innovation. This
implies that while standardization—and the technology adoption that it brings—is
an engine of economic growth, it can also act as a barrier to growth by potentially
slowing down innovation.
Our baseline framework provides a simple model for the analysis of this interplay.
Under some relatively mild assumptions, we establish the existence of a unique bal-
ance growth path that is saddle-path stable. We show that equilibrium growth is
an inverse U-shaped function of the "extent of competition" captured by the cost of
standardization. When standardization is very costly, growth is relatively slow be-
cause new products use skilled workers for a long while and this reduces their scale of
production and profitability. On the other hand, when standardization is very cheap,
growth is again relatively slow, this time because innovators enjoy ex post profits only
for a short while. This inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and growth
is consistent with the empirical findings in Aghion et al. (2005), and complements
the theoretical channel highlighted in Aghion et al. (2001, 2005), which is driven by
the interplay of their "escape competition" mechanism and the standard effects of
monopoly profits on innovation.
In our model, the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient for two reasons. First, as
in many models of endogenous technology, there is an appropriability problem: both
innovating and standardizing firms are able to appropriate only a fraction of the gain
in consumer surplus created by their investment and this makes the growth rate too
low. Second, there is a new form of "business stealing" effect, whereby the costly
standardization decisions reduce the rents of innovators. 2 The possibility that the
laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient and that growth is maximized by intermediate
levels of competition implies that welfare and growth maximizing policies are not
necessarily those that provide maximal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
to innovators. Under the assumption that a government can affect markups and
the cost of standardization by regulating IPR protection, we characterize growth
and welfare maximizing combinations of IPR and competition policies. Contrary to
most of the literature, the optimal policy is not the result of a trade-off between the
static cost of monopoly power and dynamic gains. Rather, in our model an excess
2 Another form of business stealing, studied extensively in Schumpeterian models of vertical in-
novation (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1992), is when a monopoly is destroyed by new firms introducing
a "better" version of an existing products. We suggest that standardization is also an important
source of business stealing.
of property right protection may harm growth by increasing the overload on skilled
workers, which are in short supply.
When the discount rate is small, we find that growth and welfare maximizing
IPR policy involves lower protection when R&D costs (for new products) are lower,
when markups for new products are higher and when the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor supply is greater. The latter comparative static result is a consequence of the
fact that when there is a large supply of unskilled labor, standardization becomes
more profitable and thus innovators require greater protection against standardiza-
tion. We also show that when competition policy as well as IPR policy can be used,
the optimal combination of policies involves no limits on monopoly pricing for new
products, increased competition for standardized products and lower IPR protection
than otherwise. Intuitively, lower IPR protection minimizes wasteful entry costs, but
this may lead to excessive standardization and weak incentives to innovate. To max-
imize growth or welfare, this latter effect needs to be counteracted by lower markups
for standardized products. We also show that trade liberalization in less-developed
countries may create negative effects on growth by changing the relative incentives to
innovate and standardize. However, if increased trade openness is coupled by optimal
IPR policy, it always increases welfare and growth.
Finally, we show that under different parameter configurations or different assump-
tions on competition between innovators and standardizers, a new type of multiplicity
of equilibria (of balanced growth paths) arises. When too much of the resources of the
economy are devoted to standardization, expected returns from innovation are lower
and this limits innovative activity. Expectation of lower innovation reduces interest
rates and encourages further standardization. Consequently, there exist equilibria
with different levels (paths) of innovation and standardization. It is noteworthy that
this multiplicity does not rely on technological complementarities (previously studied
and emphasized in the literature), and has much more of the flavor of "self-fulfilling
equilibria," whereby the relative prices change in order to support equilibria consistent
with initial expectations.
Our paper is related to several different literatures. In addition to the endoge-
nous growth and innovation literatures (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992, Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Romer, 1990, Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos, 1990, Stokey,
1991), there are now several complementary frameworks for the analysis of technol-
ogy adoption. These can be classified into three groups. The first includes models
based on Nelson and Phelps's (1966) important approach, with slow diffusion of tech-
nologies across countries (and across firms), often related to the human capital of
the workers employed by the technology adopting firms. This framework is incor-
porated into different types of endogenous growth models, for example, in Howitt
(2000), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), and Acemoglu (2009, Chapter 18).
Several papers provide more microeconomic foundations for slow diffusion. These
include, among others, Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Jo-
vanovic (2009) and Galor and Tsiddon (1997), which model either the role of learning
or human capital in the diffusion of technologies. The second group includes pa-
pers emphasizing barriers to technology adoption. Parente and Prescott (1994) is a
well-known example. Acemoglu (2005) discusses the political economy foundations of
why some societies may choose to erect entry barriers against technology adoption.
The final group includes models in which diffusion of technology is slowed down or
prevented because of the inappropriateness of technologies invented in one part of
the world to other countries (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001, Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1969, Basu and Weil, 1998 and David, 1975). Gancia and Zilibotti (2009)
propose a unified framework for studying technology diffusion in models of endoge-
nous technical change. Our approach emphasizing standardization is different from,
though complementary to, all three groups of papers.
Our paper is also related to Krugman's (1979) model of North-South trade and
technology diffusion, whereby the South adopts new products with a delay. Krugman,
in turn, was inspired by Vernon's (1966) model of the product cycle and his approach
has been further extended by Grossman and Helpmarf (1991) and Helpman (1993). 3
Our approach differs from all these models because innovation and standardization
make different use of skilled and unskilled workers and because we focus on a closed
economy general equilibrium setup rather than the interactions between technolog-
ically advanced and backward countries as in these papers. A new implication of
our alternative set of assumptions is that, differently from previous models, growth
is an inverse-U function of standardization. More importantly, none of the above
paper characterizes the optimal IPR policy and how it varies with skill abundance.
Grossman and Lai (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2005) study the incentives that
governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading economy. Their frame-
work, however, abstracts from the technology adoption choice and from the role of
skill which are central to our analysis.
Finally, our emphasis on the role of skilled workers in the production of new goods
and unskilled workers in the production of standardized goods makes our paper also
3 Similar themes are also explored in Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2008), Antras (2005), Dinopoulos
and Segerstrom (2007, 2009), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001).
related to the literature on technological change and wage inequality; see, among
others, Acemoglu (1998, 2003), Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002), Caselli (1999),
Galor and Moav (2000), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), and Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull and Violante (2000). The approach in Galor and Moav (2000) is particu-
larly related, since their notion of ability-biased technological change also generates
predictions for wage inequality similar to ours, though the economic mechanism and
other implications are very different.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a dynamic model of
endogenous growth through innovation and standardization. It provides conditions for
the existence, uniqueness and stability of a dynamic equilibrium with balanced growth
and derives an inverse-U relationship between the competition from standardized
products and growth. Section 3 presents the welfare analysis. After studying the first
best allocation, it characterizes growth and welfare maximizing IPR and competition
policies as function of parameters. As an application of these results, we discuss how
trade liberalization in less developed countries affects innovation, standardization
and the optimal policies. Section 4 shows how a modified version of the model may
generate multiple equilibria and poverty traps. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Growth through Innovation and Standardization
2.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by infinitely-lived households who derive utility from con-
sumption Ct and supply labor inelastically. Households are composed by two types
of agents: high-skill workers, with aggregate supply H, and low-skill workers, with
aggregate supply L. The utility function of the representative household is:
U= / e~ pt log Ct dt,
Jo
where p > is the discount rate. The representative household sets a consumption
plan to maximize utility, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a No-
Ponzi game condition. The consumption plan satisfies the standard Euler equation:
^=rt -p, (1)
where rt is the interest rate. Time-indexes are henceforth omitted when this causes
no confusion.
2.2 Technology and Market Structure
Aggregate output, Y, is a CES function denned over a measure A of goods available
in the economy. As in Romer (1990), the measure of goods A captures the level of
technological knowledge that grows endogenously through innovation. However, we
assume that, upon introduction, new goods involve complex technologies that can
only be operated by skilled workers. After a costly process of standardization, the
production process is simplified and the good can then be produced by unskilled
workers too. Despite this change in the production process, good characteristics
remain unaltered so that all varieties contribute to final output symmetrically. Thus,
Y is defined as:
/ fA $=i \ «=* / [Al «=i l'A» «=i \ «^
Y =ZU V di ) = z (A xL,i di + jo xfr dij , (2)
where Ah is the measure of hi-tech goods, Al is the measure of low-tech (standard-
ized) goods and A = AH + AL . e > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
The term Z = A c ~ l is a normalizing factor that ensures that output is linear in tech-
nology and thus makes the final good production function consistent with balanced
growth (without introducing additional externalities in R&D technology as we will
see below). To see why, note that with this formulation when X{ — x, aggregate
productivity, Yj (Ax), is equal to A—as in AK models. 4
From (2), the relative demand for any two goods i,j E A is:
/ \
~ 1/e
'"
' * »
. (3)
We choose Y to be the numeraire, implying that the minimum cost of purchasing
one unit of Y must be equal to one:
Each hi-tech good is produced by a monopolist with a technology that requires
one unit of skilled labor per unit of output. Each low-tech good is produced by a
4The canonical endogenous growth models that do not feature the Z term and allow for a ^ 2
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991) ensure balanced growth by imposing an externality in the
innovation possibilities frontier (R&D technology). Having the externality in the production good
function instead of the R&D technology is no less general and simplifies our analysis.
monopolist with a technology that requires one unit of labor per unit of output. Thus,
the marginal cost is equal to the wage of skilled workers, wH , for hi-tech firms and
the wage of unskilled workers, wl, for low-tech firms. Since high-skill worker can be
employed by both high- and low-tech firms, then wh > wl-
When standardization occurs, there are two potential producers (a high- and a
low-tech one) for the same variety. The competition between these producers is
described by a sequential entry-and-exit game. In stage (i) a low-tech firm can enter
and produce a standardized version of the intermediate variety. Then, in stage (ii),
the incumbent decides whether to exit or fight the entrant. Exit is assumed to be
irreversible, i.e., when a hi-tech firm leaves the market it cannot go back to it and the
low-tech firm becomes a monopolist. If the incumbent does not exit, the two firms
compete d la Bertand (stage (hi)). We assume that all firms entering stage (iii) must
produce (and thus pay the cost of producing) at least £ > units of output (without
this assumption, stage (ii) would be vacuous, as incumbents would have a "weakly
dominant" strategy of staying in and producing x — in stage (iii)).
Regardless of the behavior of other producers or other prices in this economy, a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game must have the following features: standard-
ization in sector j will be followed by the exit of the high-skill incumbent whenever
Wh > wl- If the incumbent did not exit, competition in stage (iii) would result in all
of the market being captured by the low-tech firm due to its cost advantage and the
incumbent would make a loss on the £ > units that it is forced to produce. Thus,
as long as the skill premium is positive, firms contemplating standardization can ig-
nore any competition from incumbents. However, if wH < wL incumbents would fight
entrants and can dominate the market. Anticipating this, standardization is not prof-
itable in this case and will not take place. Finally, in the case where wh — wl, there
is a potential multiplicity of equilibria, where the incumbent is indifferent between
fighting and exiting. In what follows, we will ignore this multiplicity and adopt the
tie-breaking rule that in this case the incumbent fights (we modify this assumption
in Section 4). We summarize the main results of this discussion in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 In any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the entry-and-exit game de-
scribed above, there is only one active producer in equilibrium. Whenever wh > wl
all hi-tech firms facing the entry of a low-tech competitor exit the market. Whenever
wh < wl hi-tech incumbents would fight entry, and no standardization occurs.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the limit economy as £ —> 0. 5 Since in
equilibrium there is only one active producer, the price of each good will always be a
markup over the marginal cost:
Ph = ( 1
J
wH and pL = ( 1 j wL . (5)
Symmetry and labor market clearing pin down the scale of production of each firm:
xl = -7- and x# = T~> (6 )
-Ax, Ah
where recall that H is the number of skilled workers employed by hi-tech firms and
L is the remaining labor force. Markup pricing implies that profits are a constant
fraction of revenues:
PhH . PlL
nH =^ and *l = 7al (7)
At this point, it is useful to define the following variables: n = An/A and ft. =
H/L. That is, n is the fraction of hi-tech goods over the total and h is the relative
endowment of skilled workers. Then, using demand (3) and (6),, we can solve for
relative prices as:
»£
=
(^v
1/e
= (h^-^y
1A
(8)
Pl \xlJ \ n J
and
fc^ . (9)
n )
Intuitively, the skill premium wh/wl depends negatively on the relative supply of
skill (h = H/L) and positively on the relative number of hi-tech firms demanding
skilled workers. Note that wh = wl at:
n
min s h+1
For simplicity, we restrict attention to initial states of technology such that n > nmin .
As an implication of Proposition 1, if we start from n > nmm , the equilibrium will
always remain in the interval n
€
[nmm ,l]. We can therefore restrict attention to
this interval, over which skilled workers never seek employment in low-tech firms.
5The focus on the limit economy is for simplicity. We could alternative model the game differently,
and assume away stage (ii). Although conceptually similar, this case is less tractable.
Using (7) and (8) yields relative profits:
^ / l_-n
1-1/6
(10)
This equation shows that the relative profitability of hi-tech firms, tth/^l, is increas-
ing in the relative supply of skill, H/L, because of a standard market size effect and
decreasing in the relative number of hi-tech firm, Ajj/Al. The reason for the latter
effect is that a larger number of firms of a given type implies stiffer competition for
labor and a lower equilibrium firm scale.
Next, to solve for the level of profits, we first use symmetry into (4) to obtain:
A
PL
A
(l-n) ( P_l
-Ph
l-e
+ n
1/(6-1)
and ;n)
1 — n + n
Ph_
Pl
l-e 1/(6-1)
Using these together with (8) into (7) yields:
H
Tiff
e
L
KL
e
i M - - i
n
I
- ( -
- 1
n
i
E-]
n<-- 1 , and
:i-n)$=i
(12)
Note that, for a given n, profits per firm remain constant. Moreover, the following
lemma formalizes some important properties of the profit functions:
Lemma 1 Assume e > 2. Then, for n € [nmm , l] :
dn
Moreover, ni is a convex function of n.
< and —— > 0.
9n
(13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The condition e > 2 is sufficient—though not necessary—for the effect of compe-
tition for labor to be strong enough to guarantee that an increase in the number of
hi-tech (low-tech) firms reduces the absolute profit of hi-tech (low-tech) firms. In the
9
rest of the paper, we assume that the restriction on e in Lemma 1 is satisfied. 6
2.3 Standardized Goods, Production and Profits
Substituting (6) into (2), the equilibrium level of aggregate output can be expressed
as:
Y = A (l-n)<L— +n*H—
,
(14)
dY A l-W\ r £-1 ( L \
£-1 "
e
dn e — 1 \n) U-»J
showing that output is linear in the overall level of technology, A, and is a constant-
elasticity function of H and L. From (14), we have that
(15)
which implies that aggregate output is maximized when nj (1 — n) — h. Intuitively,
production is maximized when the fraction of hi-tech products is equal to the fraction
of skilled workers in the population, so that xL = xH and prices are equalized across
goods. Equation (14) is important in that it highlights the value of technology diffu-
sion: by shifting some technologies to low-skill workers, standardization "alleviates"
the pressure on scarce high-skill workers, thereby raising aggregate demand. It also
shows that the effect of standardization on production, for given A, disappears as
goods become more substitutable (high e). In the limit as e —> oo, there is no gain to
smoothing consumption across goods (xl = xh) so that Y only depends on aggregate
productivity A.
Finally, to better understand the effect of technology diffusion on innovation,
it is also useful to express profits as a function of Y. Using (2)-(4) to substitute
i-2
Ph — A <' (Y/xh) into (7), profits of a hi-tech firm can be written as:
A similar expression holds for ttl. Notice that profits are proportional to aggregate
demand, Y. Thus, as long as faster technology diffusion (lower n) through standard-
ization raises Y, it also tends to increase profits. On the contrary, an increase in
6An elasticity of substitution between products greater than 2 is consistent with most empirical
evidence in this area. See, for example, Broda and Weinstain (2006).
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n > nmm reduces the instantaneous profit rate of hi-tech firms
d%H n 1 dY n e — 1
dn txh e dn Y
< 0. (17)
2.4 Innovation and Standardization
We model both innovation, i.e., the introduction of a new hi-tech good, and standard-
ization, i.e., the process that turns an existing hi-tech product into a low-tech variety,
as costly activities. We follow the "lab-equipment" approach and define the costs of
these activities in terms of output, Y. In particular, we assume that introducing a
new hi-tech good requires fxH units of the numeraire, while standardizing an existing
hi-tech good costs \xL units of Y . We may think of fiL as capturing the technical
cost of simplifying the production process plus any policy induced costs due to IPR
regulations restricting the access to new technologies.
Next, we define V# and Vl as the net present discounted value of a firm producing
a hi-tech and a low-tech good, respectively. These are given by the discounted value of
the expected profit stream earned by each type of firm and must satisfy the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations:
rVL = n L + VL (18)
rVH = tth + Vh - mVH
,
where m is the arrival rate of standardization, which is endogenous and depends on the
intensity of investment in standardization. These equations say that the instantaneous
profit from running a firm plus any capital gain or losses must be equal to the return
from lending the market value of the firm at the risk-free rate, r. Note that, at a flow
rate m, a hi-tech firm is replaced by a low-tech producer and the value Vh is lost.
Free-entry in turn implies that the value of innovation and standardization can
be no greater than their respective costs:
VH < fiH and vl < Ml-
If VH < fiH (Vl < Ml)' trien the value of innovation (standardization) is lower than
its cost and there will be no investment in that activity.
11
2.5 Dynamic Equilibrium
A dynamic equilibrium is a time path for (C, Xi, A, n, r, pA such that monopolists
maximize the discounted value of profits, the evolution of technology is determined
by free entry in innovation and standardization, the time path for prices is consistent
with market clearing and the time path for consumption is consistent with household
maximization. We will now show that a dynamic equilibrium can be represented as a
solution to two differential equations. Let us first define:
C Y A
X
=A ; y =A> 9 =A"
The first differential equation is the law of motion of the fraction of hi-tech goods, n.
This is the state variable of the system. Given that hi-tech goods are replaced by a
low-tech goods at the endogenous rate m, the flow of newly standardized products is
Al — tuAh- Prom this and the definition n = (A — Al)/A we obtain:
h = (1 — n) g — ran. (19)
The second differential equation is the law of motion of x- Differentiating x and using
the consumption Euler equation (1) yields:
Z = r -p-g (20)
X
Next, to solve for g, we use the aggregate resource constraint. In particular,
consumption is equal to production minus investment in innovation, /j,hA, and in
standardization, /iLA^. Noting that A/A = g and AL/A = mn, we can thus write:
X = y~ Vh9 ~ ^Lmn
Substituting for g from this equation (i.e., g — (y — iiLmn — x) I^h) in^° (19) and
(20) gives the following two equation dynamical system in the (n, x) space:
x
= r - p
V„
— (21)
n \ n J fiH V /W
Note that y is a function of n (see equation (14)). Finally, r and m can be found
12
as functions of n from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. First, note that, if
there is positive imitation (m > 0), then free-entry implies VL — fiL . Given that fiL
is constant, Vl must be constant too, Vi = 0. Likewise, if there is positive innovation
(g > 0), then V# = 0. Next, equations (18) can be solved for the interest rate in the
two cases:
r =
ttl
Ml
if m >
tth
r = m if g > 0.
Mff
We summarize these findings in the following proposition.
(23)
(24)
Proposition 2 A dynamic equilibrium is characterized by (i) the autonomous system
of differential equations (21)-(22) in the (n,x) space where
y = y(n) = (l-n)'LV + n«#V
i \
(^(n) nH (n)
r = r (n) = max < , n
{ Ml /%
( if r>
*Lin)
m = m (n) =
^
1
?/(n)-x
if r ^
nH^
— m
anrf 7T/y (n) and ttl (n) are given by (12), (ii) a pair of initial conditions, no and Aq,
and (Hi) the transversality condition lim^oo exp ( — fQ rsds) f ' Vidi = 0.
2.6 Balanced Growth Path
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is a dynamic equilibrium such that h = rh = and,
hence, the skill premium and the interest rate are at a steady-state level. An "interior"
BGP is a BGP where, in addition, m > and g > 0. Equation (19) implies that
an interior BGP must feature mss — g (1 — n) jn = (r — p) (1 — n) jn. To find the
associated BGP interest rate, we use the free-entry conditions for standardization and
innovation. Using (12), the following equation determines the interest rate consistent
with m > 0:
Tl (n) = Ik
Ml
L
(25)
n
i
i -
1
(l-n)*=*
13
Next, the free-entry condition for hi-tech firms, conditional on the BGP standardiza-
tion rate, determines the interest rate consistent with the BGP:
r%(n) = — -m ss = n— + (l-n)p (26)
M// /Ah
i
£-1H
/% e n
i
n*- 1 + (1 — n) p.
The curves r sjf (n) and r^ (n) can be interpreted as the (instantaneous) return from
innovation (conditional on h = 0) and standardization, respectively. In the space
(n,r), the BGP value of n can be found as their crossing point: in other words,
along a BGP, both innovation and standardization must be equally profitable.' We
summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An interior BGP is a dynamic equilibrium such that n — nss where
nss satisfies
rL (n°°) = r™(ns°), (27)
and rL (nss ) and rjy (nss ) are given by (25) and (26), respectively. Given nss , the
BGP interest rate is rss — ttl (nss ) /pL , and the standardization rate is mss =
(rss — p) (1 — n
ss
) /n
ss
,
where n^ is as in (12) [evaluated at n — nssJ. Finally, Ah,
AL , Y and C all grow at the same rate, gss = rss — p.
To characterize the set of BGP, we need to study the properties of 77, (n) and
r
S
tf(n). Due to the shape of itl, rL (n) is increasing and convex. Provided that p
is not too high, r^ (n) is non-monotonic (first increasing and then decreasing) and
concave in n. 8 The intuition for the non monotonicity is as follows. When n is
high, competition for skilled workers among hi-tech firms brings tth down and this
lowers the return to innovation. Moreover, when n is higher than hj (h + 1) aggregate
productivity and Y are low, because skilled workers have too many tasks to perform,
while unskilled workers too little. This tends to reduce ttjj even further. When n
is low, ixH is high, but the flow rate of standardization is high as well (since, recall,
mss = g (1 — n) jn) and this brings down the return to innovation.
Figure 1 shows the BGP relationship between r and n. Note that, as long as
m > 0, the equilibrium must lie on the (dashed) rL (n) curve. An interior BGP must
7
It can also be verified straightforwardly that the allocation corresponding to this crossing point
satisfies the transversality condition.
8 A formal argument can be found in the proof of Proposition 4.
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Figure 1: Solid = r^ (n), Dashed = rL (n)
also lie on the (solid) r# (n) curve. Thus, the interior BGP value of n is identified by
the intersection. The following assumptions guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of a BGP, and that such BGP is interior.
Assumption 1 : < p < H/ (/%e)
.
This condition is standard: it guarantees that innovation is sufficiently profitable
to sustain endogenous growth and that the transversality condition is satisfied.
Assumption 2 ; [iH < ^LTT7—A__.
Assumption 2 ensures that rff (nmm ) > rL (n
min
) , ruling out the uninteresting
case in which standardization is always more profitable than innovation when n is
expected to stay constant, and guarantees that the BGP is interior and unique. We
state the existence and uniqueness of the BGP in a formal proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1-2 hold. Then there exist a unique BGP equi-
librium.
15
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium,
denoted by (nss
,x
ss
)- The next goal is to prove the (local) existence and uniqueness
of a dynamic equilibrium converging to this BGP. Unfortunately, the analysis of
dynamics is complicated by several factors. First, the dynamic system (21)-(22) is
highly nonlinear. Second, it may exhibit discontinuities in the standardization rate
(and thus in the interest rate) along the equilibrium path. Intuitively, at (nss
,x
ss
)
there is both innovation and standardization (otherwise we could not have n = 0). It
is relatively easy to prove that, similar to models of directed change (e.g., Acemoglu
2002 and Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001), there exists a dynamic equilibrium converging
to the BGP featuring either only innovation (when n < nss ) or only standardization
(when n > nss ). This implies that when the economy approaches the BGP from
the left, the standardization rate and the interest rate both jump once the BGP is
reached. In particular, when n < nss
,
there is no standardization, thus, m — 0, while
in BGP we have m > 0. Since throughout there is innovation and thus the value
of hi-tech firms must remain constant at Vh = Affi there can be no jump in r + m.
Consequently, there must be an exactly offsetting jump in interest rate r when the
BGP is reached and the standardization rate, m, jumps. 9
However, it turns out to be more difficult to prove that there exist no other
dynamic equilibria. In particular, we must rule out the existence of equilibrium
trajectories (solutions to (21)-(22)) converging to (nss ,x
ss
) with both innovation and
standardization out of BGP. Numerical analysis suggests that no such trajectory exists
as long as Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. In particular, the system (21)-(22) under
the condition that m = tth (n) /fJ-H~ nL {n) /Ml (i-e -i under the condition that there is
both innovation and standardization) is globally unstable around (nss
, x
ss
)- However,
we can only prove this analytically under additional conditions. In particular, we must
impose the following parameter restriction: 10
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 and (28) hold. Then there ex-
9 Note that the discontinuous behavior of the standardization rate and interest does not imply
any jump in the asset values, Vh and/or Vl- Rather, the rate of change of these asset values may
jump locally.
10 This restriction ensures that nmm = h/ (1 + h) be not too small, which is key in the proof
strategy (see Appendix). For example, when e = 2, it requires nmin = hj (1 + h) > 0.28 and when
e = 3, nmin = h/{l + h)> 0.21.
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ists p > such that, for p < p, the interior BGP is locally saddle-path stable. In
particular, if nto is in the neighborhood of its BGP value, nss , and nto > nss [resp.,
nto < n
ss
], then there exists a unique path converging to the BGP such that for some
finite t > t , we have r & [t , t\, mT > 0, gT = and hT < [resp., mT = 0, gT >
and hT > 0], and the economy attains the BGP at t (i.e., for all r > t, we have
nT = n
ss
,
mT — mss , and gT = g ss ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.7 Growth and Standardization: an Inverse-U Relationship
How does the cost of standardization, pL , affect the BGP growth rate, gss ? Answering
this question is important from both a normative and a positive perspective. First,
policies such as IPR protection are likely to have an impact on the profitability of
standardization. Therefore, knowing the relationship between standardization and
growth is a key step for policy evaluation. Second, the difficulty to standardize may
vary across technologies and over time.
The cost of standardization affects rr, (n), but not rjf (n). Thus, increasing the
cost of standardization amounts to shifting the tl (n) curve in Figure 1 and therefore
the intersection, form n = nmm (low pL ) to n —> 1 (high pL ). The effect on the growth
rate depends in turn on the relationship between g
ss and n:
g°°(n) = r%(n)-p = n(^M-p
This expression highlights the trade-off between innovation and standardization: a
high standardization rate (and thus a low n) increases the instantaneous profit rate
irH (n), but lowers the expected profit duration. Taking the derivative and using (17)
yields:
dg ss (n)
_
7iH (n) n dnH (n)
dn pH pH dn
KHJn)
^ |
dY{n) n
epH \ dn Y (n)
From (15), 8Y (n) /dn = at n = nmin . For n > nmin , we have 8Y (n) /dn < with
lim,,-,! dY (n) /dn = — oo. Thus:
dgss (n)
dn
H + L dg ss (n)
= p and lim— = — oo.
n=nmi „ PH e
2 n-i dn
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Provided that p < ^-§, g
ss (n) is an inverse-U function of n. Intuitively, at n = 1
the wage of unskilled workers is zero and hence the marginal value of transferring
technologies to them (in terms of higher aggregate demand and thus also profits)
is infinite. Instead, at n = nmin
,
aggregate output Y is maximized and marginal
changes in n have second order effects on aggregate production. Moreover, given that
future profits are discounted, the impact of prolonging the expected profit stream
(high n) on innovation vanishes if p is high. When p < jpjj, growth is maximized at
n* 6 (nmin , 1) that solves:
ejjjj
_
dY(n*) n*
P
nH (n*) dn* Y(n*Y { '
The condition p < ^-§ is satisfied whenever Assumption 1 (which we imposed above
and which guarantees g > 0) and e < 1 + 1/h, i.e., if skilled workers are sufficiently
scarce. It is also satisfied when p and pH are sufficiently low. Now recalling that in
BGP n is an increasing function of fiL , we have the following result (proof in the
text):
an inverse U-shaped function of the cost of standardization.
Proposition 6 Let g
33 be the BGP growth rate and assume p < ^-^ . Then, g3S is
Figure 1 provides a geometric intuition. Starting from a very high nL such that
rff (n) is in its decreasing portion, a decrease in \xL moves the equilibrium to the left
along the schedule rfj (n) . This yields a lower n
ss and thus higher growth. Therefore,
in this region, a decrease in pL increases growth. However, after the maximum of the
T"H (n) schedule is passed, further decreases in pL reduce n and growth.
Proposition 6 also has interesting implications for the skill premium. Recall that,
in this model, the skill-premium is the market value of being able to operate new
technologies and produce hi-tech goods. For this reason, it is increasing in the frac-
tion of hi-tech firms (see equation (9)). Since growth is an inverse-U function of n,
the model also predicts a inverse U-shaped relationship between growth and wage
inequality, as shown in Figure 2. Intuitively, a very high skill-premium could be a
sign that standardization is so costly to slow down growth. A very low skill premium,
however, might be a sign of too fast standardization and thus weak incentives to
innovate.
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Figure 2: Growth and the Skill Premium
3 Welfare Analysis and Optimal Policies
We now turn to the normative analysis. We start by characterizing the Pareto optimal
allocation for a given /j,L , representing the technical cost of standardization. This
allows us to identify the inefficiencies that are present in the decentralized equilibrium.
Next, we focus on the constrained efficient allocation that a government could achieve
with a limited set of instruments. In particular, we allow the government to increase
the cost of standardization above fiL through IPR regulations and to influence the
level of competition. Finally, we briefly discuss how North-South trade affects the
optimal policies.
3.1 Pareto Optimal Allocation
The Pareto optimal allocation is the one chosen by a social planner seeking to max-
imize the utility of the representative agent, subject to the production function (14)
and for given costs of innovation,
fj,H , and standardization, \iL . The current value
Hamiltonian for the problem is:
U = In (Y -IH - IL + Si? +SL
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where Ijj and 1^ are investment in innovation and standardization, respectively. The
control variables are IH and II, while the state variables are A and Al, with co-state
variables £H and £L , respectively. Prom the first order conditions, the Pareto optimal
n solves:
——
9Y 1
dA~^~dA~L ]rL ( }
That is, the planner equates the marginal rate of technical substitution between hi-
tech and low-tech products to their relative development costs. The Euler equation
for the planner is:
C
_dYJ_
C~ dAfj,H P
'
By comparing these results to those in the previous section, we can see that the
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient for two reasons.
First, there is a standard appropriability problem whereby firms only appropriate
a fraction of the value of innovation/standardization so that R&D investment is too
low. To isolate this inefficiency, consider the simplest case L = 0, so that there is
no standardization and Y = AH, 7r# = H/e. In this case, the social return from
innovation is H while the private return is only r = H/e < H. The same form of
appropriability effect also applies when L > 0.
Second, there is too much standardization relative to innovation due to a business
stealing externality: the social value of innovation is permanent while the private
benefit is temporary. A particularly simple case to highlight this inefficiency is when
e = 2 so that (30) simplifies to:
n
_ h fVL + VH
^
1-n V Vh
In the decentralized equilibrium, instead, the condition rL (n) = r" (n) yields:
H- = h
m + r J /j,h
Clearly, n is too low in the decentralized economy.
To correct the first inefficiency, subsidies to innovation (and standardization) are
needed. On the other hand, the business stealing externality can be corrected by
introducing a licensing policy requiring low-tech firms to compensate the losses they
impose on hi-tech firms. In particular, suppose that firms that standardize must
pay a one-time licensing fee /^c to the original inventor. In this case, the free-entry
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conditions together with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (18) become:
ith ~ m (VH - I2f)
VH = = nH .
Clearly, the business stealing effect is removed when fi'lc = fiH , that is, when low-tech
firms compensate the hi-tech produces for the entire capital loss fiH . We summarize
these results in the proposition (proof in the text). 11
Proposition 7 The Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized using a subsidy to
innovation and a license fee imposed on firms standardizing new products.
3.2 Constrained Efficiency: Optimal fiL
Proposition 7 shows how the Pareto optimal allocation can be decentralized. However,
the subsidies to innovation require lump-sum taxes and in addition, the government
would need to set up and operate a system of licensing fees. In practice, both of
these might be difficult. 12 Motivated by this reasoning, we now analyze a constrained
efficient policy, where we limit the instruments of the government. In particular,
we assume that the government can only affect the standardization cost through IPR
regulations restricting the access to new technologies, and ask what would the optimal
policy be in this case. 13 More precisely, we find the (constant) \x*L that maximizes
11 Note that there is no static distortion due to monopoly pricing. This is because in our model
all firms only use inelastically supplied factors (skilled and unskilled labor). Thus, markups do not
distort the allocation. In a more general model, subsidies to production would also be needed correct
for the static inefficiency.
12Some reasons emphasized in the literature why licensing may fail include asymmetric information
and bilateral monopoly (e.g., Bessen and Maskin, 2006). See also Chari et al. (2009) on the
difficulties of using market signals to determine the value of existing innovations.
13We do not consider patent policies explicitly for a number of reasons. Patents are often perceived
as offering relatively weak protection of IPR, less than lead time and learning-curve advantage in
preventing duplication. Patents disclose information, the application process is often lengthy and
cannot prevent competitors from "inventing around" patents. Overall, Levin et al. (1987) found that
patents increase imitation costs by 7-15%. This support our approach of modeling IPR protection
as an additional cost.
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BGP utility:
OO
maxpW = pi ln(-
J
+ln(A e9t
)
o
~ pt dt (31)
= ln&" +— •
The optimal policy maximizes a weighted sum of the consumption level and its growth
rate. In turn, g
ss
(p,L ) = n [~kh (n) IPh ~ p] evaluated at the n (pL ) that solves (27)
and x
ss = y(n ) ~ 9 (Pl) Ip-h + Ml U — n)L evaluated at the same 77. In general,
problem (31) does not have a closed-form solution. Nonetheless, we can make progress
by considering two polar cases.
3. 2. 1 Optimal/Growth Maximizing Policy: p —*
As p —> 0, the optimal policy is to maximize g
ss
. For this case, we have simple analytic
results. Manipulating the first order condition (29), the optimal n* is implicitly
defined by:
Note that the LHS is decreasing in n, from infinity to zero, while the RHS is increasing
in n, ranging from minus infinity to 1/e. Thus, the solution n* is always interior and
unique. Using the implicit function theorem yields:
9_f± =
t^l >0 and ^A = (1 _ n * )(1 _ e + n .e)>0 (33)
oe n* e — 1 ah n*
because, from (32), en* — e + 1 = e (n*) 7 (1 — n*)~r h^ > 0. That is, the optimal
fraction of hi-tech goods is increasing in the relative skill-endowment and in the
elasticity of substitution across products.
Once we have n*, we can use the indifference condition between innovation and
standardization, W- = ^tt
-, to solve for the p*L that implements n*. When p —> and
77i = g (1 — n) jn we obtain:
^ = ^I^fi^/,^ = ^I (34)
7rL /ijr n \ n ) pL n
The equilibrium fraction of hi-tech goods, n, depends on relative profits (tth/Vl),
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relative R&D costs (hh/^l)' and the standardization risk faced by hi-tech firms
(captured by the factor 1/n). Note that a decline in the relative skill supply, h, leads
to a more than proportional fall in n because tth/^l falls and m rises. Substituting
L^L-h) £ from (32) we can find the optimal standardization cost as:
„!-«,(»•- l + i)"' =
r-f^. (35,
This expression has the advantage that it only depends on h through n* and can be
used to study the determinants of the optimal policy. Differentiating (35) and using
(33), we obtain the following proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 8 Consider the case p —> 0. BGP welfare and growth are maximized
when the cost of standardization pL satisfies (35) and n* is the solution to (32). The
following comparative static results hold:
dfij h
~dh^l
d/i*L e n*e — 1
= 1
-en*(l-n*) <
> 0.
de fi*L e - 1
The results summarized in this proposition are intuitive. Changes in the cost of
innovation should be followed by equal changes in the cost of standardization, so as to
keep the optimal n constant. A decline in the relative supply of skilled workers makes
technology diffusion relatively more important. However, the incentive to standardize
increases so much (both because of the change in instantaneous profits and because
the equilibrium m increases too) that the optimal policy is to make standardization
more costly. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, a higher abundance of unskilled worker
calls for stronger IPR protection. Finally, given that e > 2, a lower elasticity of
substitution makes the diffusion of technologies to low-skill workers more important
for aggregate productivity and reduces the optimal IPR, p*L .
lA
3.2.2 Optimal Policy: high p
To understand how the optimal policy changes with the discount rate, we consider
the other polar case. In particular, assume that p —-> ^—. As we will see, this is
14To see this, recall that en* - e + 1 > 0. Then, e > 2 implies (en* - 1) / (e - 1) > 0.
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the highest p compatible with positive growth. In this case, Section 2.7 shows that
g is maximized at the corner nmin = h/(h + 1). Moreover, for n —» n™ we have
jth = ^^ and 3 = ^^ - p -> (since p -> ^7). Next, the result that 3 must
be close to zero yields x
sa
=
V-, which is also maximized at nmm . Thus, with high
discounting the optimal policy is the same as the one that maximizes static output
(and consumption) only. Reaching this point requires setting p*L = pH . Note that,
in this extreme scenario, the optimal policy becomes independent of h and other
parameters. Comparing the policy p*L = pH to (35) shows, not surprisingly, that high
discounting implies a lower optimal protection of IPR.
3.3 Other Competition Policies
In practice, several other competition policies, besides licensing fees and intellectual
property rights, are used in order to affect the profitability of standardization. We
now briefly discuss the implications of such policies. Suppose that the government
can directly affect markups in the hi-tech and the low-tech sectors. In particular, it
can set exx > e and ex > e in the pricing equations (5).
When markups vary across firms, profits (16) become:
,L -£L (JL-f and ,r.t±(5)* (36)
eL \\-n) eH \n J
From rL (n) = ttl/
'
Hl and the above expressions, it is immediate to see that the
BGP n only depends on the product pL eL . This result highlights that competition
policy (ex) and IPR protection (pL ) are substitutes. Intuitively, with lower mark-ups
(high ex) for low-tech firms, there is less entry in the L-sector. Yet, the government
can offset this effect by reducing pL , so that it becomes easier to standardize. On the
contrary, g
ss (n) does not depend on eL , so that n* is as before. Given that intervening
on pL or ex is equally effective to implement a desired n*, the optimal mix depends
on the relative costs of the two policies.
Now when we also have p —> 0, equation (35) becomes:
/* -?- r^r^- ^ex 1 — e + n*e
Then, under the assumptions that ex. can be changed at no cost, it is easy to see that
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the optimal policy is:
£h =
Ia = ^r
(-L =
M
min l_ e + n * €
where /j.™'n > is the minimum "technical" cost of standardization (i.e., with no
IPR protection). Intuitively, full monopoly among hi-tech firms ensures high innova-
tion; jj,*l = ptLmin minimizes the resources spent on standardization; high competition
among low-tech firms yields the optimal n*. If the desired level of competition ex,
cannot be achieved, then \i*L should be adjusted upward accordingly. 15
3.4 North-South Trade and IPR Policy
We now ask how trade opening in countries with a large supply of unskilled workers
affects the optimal IPR policy. This question is interesting because there is an un-
settled debate on whether trade liberalization in less developed countries should be
accompanied by tighter IPR protection, as implied by the TRIPs Agreement, or by
less strict IPR policies, which serve to encourage technology diffusion to less advanced
economies. We can investigate this question using our model.
Consider an integrated world economy (the North), described by the model in
Section 2. For simplicity, let us also assume that there is a single large developing
country endowed with unskilled workers only (the South). Without trade, we assume
that Northern technologies are copied at no cost by competitive firms in the South.
However, this form of technology transfer is imperfect: when a low-tech good is
introduced in the South, labor productivity there is only a fraction ip 6 (0, 1]. There
is no innovation in the South.
Now imagine that the South opens its economy to trade. We assume that economic
integration allows Northern firms to produce in the South. In the new integrated equi-
librium factor prices are equalized (or else firms would relocate to the country where
15 Another way to highlight the same result is that policy does not affect markups, but rather
patent duration in the low-tech sector. In the model considered so far, patent length is infinite in
the low-tech sector. Suppose, however, that patent duration is finite and, once the patent expires,
the good is produced by unskilled workers under competitive conditions. Here, the key trade-off
is between the cost of standardization and the duration of the subsequent monopoly position in
the low-tech sector. The gist of the argument is that the best combination is, in a sense, low
IPR everywhere (low ji L and short patents). However, it has to be carefully tailored, since the
cost-relative-to-duration must be pinned down so as to get the right n.
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labor is cheaper) and Southern firms are replaced by their Northern counterpart. This
result stems from the fact that Northern firms are more productive and can capture
the entire market by charging a price equal to or lower than the marginal cost of
the Southern imitators, pi < Wl/p- However, if ip > (1 — 1/e), Northern firms must
compress their markup to keep Southern imitators out.
In sum, the effect of trade opening in the South is isomorphic to an increase
in the world endowment of L and possibly a reduction in the markup and profit
margins of low-tech firms (higher ex,). What are the implications for the BGP growth
rate and the optimal IPR policy? The change in L and £/, have opposite effects on
7Tl (see equation (36)) and hence on the return from standardization, so the rL (n)
curve in Figure 1 may either shift up or down. The r# (n) curve, instead, always
shifts up because the greater supply of low-tech goods increases the price and thus
the profitability of hi-tech products. As a result, in the new BGP, nss and g
ss may
be higher or lower. Despite this ambiguity, it is easy to see that trade opening is
necessarily growth (and welfare) enhancing if IPR policy, fiL , is correctly adjusted.
This follows immediately from the upward shift of the r s^ (n) curve, implying that
the maximum attainable r must be higher.
The crucial question, then, is how /j,l should be changed. As already seen, a higher
L/H increases the optimal level of IPR protection, /j.*l . On the other hand, higher
competition among low-tech firms, e^, calls for a reduction in fiL , to compensate for
the fall in profit margins (see equation (37)). The net effect depends on which force
dominates. If the liberalizing country is large and inefficient (low (p), the competitive
pressure posed by imitators on low-tech firms is weak, while the threat to hi-tech
firms, due to the increased incentives to standardize, is high. In this case, integration
should be followed by a tightening of IPR policies. 10
4 Extension: Multiple Equilibria and Poverty Traps
We have so far assumed that, at wH = wL , standardization stops implying that in
a BGP n stays in the range (nmin
,
1). This is an immediate consequence of the as-
sumption that, at wh = wi, incumbent hi-tech firms fight (see Proposition 1) so that
low-tech firms do not find entry profitable. Under this assumption and Assumption
2, Proposition 4 established the uniqueness of a BGP equilibrium. However, either
16 These are the policies that a world planner would choose starting from the optimum. Yet,
governments of individual countries face different incentives, because an increase in /j, l leads to a
higher skill premium and redistributes income towards skill-abundant countries. This conflict of
interests between the North and the South is studied, among others, by Grossman and Lai (2004).
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when we adopt the alternative tie-breaking rule—whereby at wh = wl hi-tech firms
facing the entry of a low-tech competitor exit—or relax Assumption 2, the model may
generate multiple equilibria and potential poverty traps. In this section, we briefly
discuss this possibility.
For brevity, we focus on the case where Assumption 2 still holds but the competi-
tion between hi-tech firms and entrants at wh = wL is resolved according to the polar
opposite tie-breaking rule. Even under this alternative tie-breaking rule, we still have
that wh > wl for any n € [0, 1] since skilled worker can always take unskilled jobs.
But in contrast to Proposition 1 now standardization may continue even at n < nmin .
As a first step in the analysis of this case, we characterize the static equilibrium
for low levels of n. Recall that wH = wL at n = n
mm
. For n < nmm
,
the skill premium
is constant at wh = wl and some high skill workers are employed in low-tech firms.
In this case, the allocation of labor between the two type of firms, h, is determined
endogenously by equation (9) after setting wh = wL . This yields h = n/(l — n) and
a profit rate of ttjj = irjj =
~r^- In other words, for sufficiently low n, it is as if
workers were perfect substitutes, prices are equalized pn = Pl, and so are profits.
To find the steady states, we draw the tl (n) and r^ (n) schedules over the entire
domain n
€ [0, 1]. Figure 3 shows the determination of nss for two possible rj, (n)
schedules, corresponding to different values of \iL . Compared to Figure 1, the first
part of both schedules is a straight line, as there the skill premium is constant and
equal to one. The interior BGPs are again the intersections between the r^ (n) (solid
line) and rL in) (dashed line) schedules.
In addition to balanced growth equilibria, now there might exist "corner steady-
states" such that n = g = m — and r = p. A corner steady state can arise in
two different circumstances: (i) at n = 0, there is no incentive to innovate nor to
standardize, i.e., p > 1LL = ^±^ and p > 1La- — ^±^: (ii) at n = 0, firms have an
incentive to standardize, i.e., p < M±L^ but there are no goods to standardize, since
n = 0. Moreover, innovation is discouraged by the expectation that new hi-tech
goods would trigger a high standardization rate. Formally, innovating firms expect
that to > ^i^ — p whenever n > 0. This conjecture does not violate the resource
constraint since the absolute investment in standardization would be infinitesimal
when n = even though the standardization rate were high. The uninteresting case
in which rL (n) lays above r^ (n) for all n is still ruled out by Assumption 2.
As shown in Figure 3, depending on the standardization cost, there are two
regimes:
High pL : For \xL > (H + L) / (pe) (lower rL (n) schedule in Figure 3), there is a
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Figure 3: Solid = r# (n), Dashed = r^ (n)
unique steady state (BGP) corresponding to the unique crossing point of the
rL (n) and r# (n) schedules.
Low fiL : For fiL < (H + L) / (pe) (upper tl (n) schedule) there are two interior and
a corner steady state. The two interior steady states can be seen in Figure
3. In this case, a corner steady state also exists, since rjf (0) = p < rL (0) =
(H + L) J (/J,L e) . Hence, standardization is profitable at n = 0.
The reason for the potential multiplicity is a complementarity between investment
decisions by firms. If firms expect n to be high in the BGP, they also anticipate a low
standardization rate, m, and this encourages further innovation. Greater innovation
in turn increases the demand for resources (i.e., the demand for "investment" rather
than consumption) and raises the interest rate. A greater interest rate reduces the
value of standardization more than the value of innovation), confirming the expecta-
tion of a low m. In contrast, when a large fraction of the resources of the economy
are devoted to standardization, expected returns from innovation decline and this
limits innovative. Expectation of lower innovation reduces the interest rates, leading
to reverse reasoning— i.e., encouraging standardization (more than innovation) and
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confirming the expectation of a high m. 17 Note that this complementarity was also
present in the model analyzed in the previous sections. Yet, it did not give rise to
multiplicity because Assumption 2 guarantees that the other candidate steady states
correspond to levels of n below nmm
,
which was ruled out by Proposition 1 under our
baseline tie-breaking rule. 18 Thus, the fact that standardization is profitable only if
unskilled labor is strictly cheaper than skilled labor prevents the economy from falling
to low-growth traps where innovation is discouraged by the expectation of a very fast
standardization rate.
We summarize the characterization of the set of steady-state equilibria in the
following proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 9 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
1. If Hi > (H + L) J (pe) there exists a unique BGP which is interior.
2. If i±L < (H + L) J (pe) there exist two interior BGP equilibria and a corner
steady state.
It is also noteworthy that the non-monotonic relationship between the g
ss and
fiL and the policy analysis derived in the previous sections now apply to the higher
interior BGP. The main novelty, however, is that too low a cost of standardization
may lead to multiple steady states, with the equilibrium determined by self-fulfilling
expectations, and stagnation.
5 Concluding Remarks
New technologies often diffuse as a result of costly adoption and standardization de-
cisions. Such standardization also creates cheaper ways of producing new products,
for example, substituting cheaper unskilled labor for the more expensive skilled labor
necessary for the production of new complex products. This process endogenously
17 To see the role of the interest rate, consider a more general formulation of preferences where 9
is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In this case, the Euler equation takes
the form C/C — (r — p) /6. Using this, equation (26) becomes:
On ita ( 1 — n
r
s
H
s (n) =
nB + 1 -ntiH \nd + 1
Note that, as 8 —» the rjf (n) curve becomes flat and the BGP is necessarily unique.
18When Assumption 2 is relaxed, it is possible that the ri (n) and rj/ (n) schedules cross twice
over the range n e [nmln , l]
.
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generates competition to original innovators. In this paper, we studied the implica-
tions of this costly process of standardization, emphasizing both its role as an engine
of growth and its potential negative effects on innovation (because of the "business
stealing" effect that it creates).
Our analysis has delivered a number of new results. First, the tension between
innovation and standardization generates an inverse U-shaped relationship between
competition and growth. Second, while technology diffusion is potentially beneficial,
it can also have destabilizing effects. Standardization can open the door to multiple
equilibria (multiple growth paths). Finally, we characterized the optimal competition
and IPR policy and how it depends on endowments and other parameters, such as the
elasticity of substitution between products. We found that innovation rents should
be protected more when skilled workers are perceived as scarcer, that is, when they
are in short supply and when the elasticity of substitutions between goods is high.
We also showed that these results provide new reasons for linking North-South trade
to intellectual property rights protection.
It is also worth noting that a key feature of our analysis is the potential compe-
tition between standardized products and the original hi-tech products. We believe
that this is a good approximation to a large number of cases in which standardization
takes place by different firms (and often in the form of slightly different products).
Nevertheless, the alternative, in which standardization is carried out by the original
innovator, is another relevant benchmark. In our follow-up work, Acemoglu et al.
(2010), we study a model of offshoring, where offshoring can be viewed as a costly
process of standardization carried out by the original innovator to make goods pro-
ducible in less developed countries with cheaper labor.
Our model yields a number of novel predictions that can be taken to the data. In
particular, it suggests that competition and IPR policy should have an impact on skill
premia. Furthermore, data on product and process innovation might be used to test
the existence of a trade-off between innovation and standardization at the industry
level. These seem interesting directions for future work.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall i\H = f^ = &&. From (11) it is immediate to see that && < if pH > pL ,
which is true in equilibrium. To establish the properties of t^l, note that:
5n , , m; fc i=i 1 -n
For e > 2, lim „_i^ = oo. Convexity of iii follows immediately because the function
^^ has no critical point.
6.2 Notes on Figures
The benchmark economy used to draw all figures has the following parameter values:
p = 0.02; e = 2; pB = 22.7, uL = 59.1; H = 1; L = 3
implying in steady state:
s = 0.02; r = 0.02; m = 0.02; n = 0.5; — = 1.5.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
A BGP must be a rest point of the dynamical system (21)-(22). We first note that
there cannot be a rest point at the boundaries n = nmm and n = 1 in view of Proposi-
tion 1. Thus any BGP must be interior as defined in Proposition 3, or equivalently, it
must be a zero of the dynamical system (21)-(22). We denote such a zero by (nss
, x
ss
),
where nss satisfies rL (n
ss
) = rj^ (nsa ) (see again Proposition 3). We prove the exis-
tence of a unique interior BGP by showing that there is a unique value nss
€
(nmin
,
l)
such that rL (n
5S
) = r
s
^ (n
ss
), that there is a unique corresponding value of x
ss and
that at (nss
,x
ss
) the transversality condition is satisfied.
We prove the first step by establishing that r# (nss ) is a continuous inverse
U-shaped function whereas rL (nss ) is a continuous, increasing and convex func-
tion. Moreover r|f (nmin ) > rL (nmin ) (which follows immediately from Assump-
tion 2) and \imn^i (rL (nss ) — rj^ (n ss )) = oo. Then, the intermediate value theo-
rem establishes the existence of such a BGP, while the shape of the two func-
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tions implies uniqueness. Let (f>(x) = x + x ( i — l) £ h~r where e > 2 and
h > 0. Standard algebra establishes that (x) is a continuous inverse U-shaped con-
cave function, such that limI_o 4> (z) — °° ar>d lim^^ 0' (x) = — oo. Thus, <f> (x)
has a unique interior maximum in the unit interval. Next, note that r^ (nss ) =
(nss ) • if/ (/%e) + (1 — nss ) p. Since r^ (n
ss
) is a linear transformation of (nss )
,
it is also a continuous inverse U-shaped concave function, with a unique interior
maximum in the unit interval. Consider now rL (nss ) . Since rL (nss ) = ix^ (n ss ) / p,L ,
Lemma 1 establishes that 77, (nss ) is increasing and convex, with lim^s^ n, (n ss ) = 00
(implying that limnM_i (r^, (n ss ) — r 3^ {n
ss
)) = 00).
Next, straightforward algebra immediately implies that, conditional on n = nss
,
m = m (nss ) and z = z (nss ) there exists a unique value \ = Xss that yields a zero of
the dynamical system (21)-(22). Finally, since in BGP r = p + g > g (from (1) and
Assumptions 1-2), the transversality condition is satisfied in the unique candidate
BGP.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that dynamic equilibria are given by solutions to dynamical system (21)-(22)
with boundary conditions given by the initial condition n = no and the transversality
condition. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4, there cannot be
any dynamic equilibrium path where n — nmm and n —> 1 . Any dynamic equilibrium
must thus either converge to the unique (interior) BGP (nss
,x
ss
) or involves cycles.
We will show in this proof that starting from any initial condition n = no in the
neighborhood of nss (the BGP), there exists a unique path converging to (nss
, \ss )
and that there cannot be cycles, thus establishing local saddle-path stability of the
dynamic equilibrium.
Because there are two sources of technical change (innovation and standardiza-
tion), we first distinguish between three possible types of potential dynamic equilibria
(which may converge to the BGP, (n3S
, x
ss
))-
CASE 1: VH = pH and VL < pL (=» m = and g = {y (n) - *)//%)• In
this case, from Proposition 3 the dynamics are governed by the following system of
ordinary differential equations:
(38)
X
X
=
717/ (n)
- P-
y{n)-
P-H
X
h = (1-n) y{n) -x
Ph
32
CASE 2: VH < pH and VL = pL (=*> m = (y (n) - x) / ("Ml) and 5 = 0). In this
case, again from Proposition 3 the dynamics are governed by the following system of
ordinary differential equations:
y ttt (n)
- = -Z±-±-p (39)
X Ml
'y{n)
-x
n = —
Ml
CASE 3: Vb = Pn anc* ^ = I^l (=> rn = tth (n) //% — ixL (n) /^L and 5 =
(2/ (n )
— pLmn — x) /Mff)- In this case, the dynamics are governed by the following
system of ordinary differential equations:
- = p (40)
X Pl Ph
mh V mW
In all three cases, the differential equations are defined over the region x £
[0,y(n)j, n
€
[nmin ,l].
Recall that in the BGP m > and g > 0. This implies that V# = /i# and
Vl = pL . Therefore, (n
ss
,x
ss
) is a zero of the dynamical system (40), but it is not
a zero either of (38) or of (39). Nevertheless, we will show that CASE 3 cannot
describe dynamic equilibrium behavior at any point with (n, x) 7^ {nss , xss )- Instead,
the equilibrium will be given by either CASE 1 or CASE 2 (depending on whether
n is above or below nss ) and will be unique. Then under the equilibrium dynamics,
the economy will converge in finite time to (nss
,x
ss
) , and then a jump in m and r
will create a switch to CASE 3 at that point, and since (nss
, x
ss
) is a zero of (40), the
economy will have reached the BGP and will stay at (nss
, x
ss
) thereafter.
We prove by first establishing several Lemmas. First, Lemma 2 establishes that,
if n < nss
,
there exists a unique trajectory converging to (nS3
,x
ss
) (it is immediate
that, if n < nss
,
there exists no trajectory converging to (nss ,v ss ) following the
dynamics (39), since these would imply n < 0). Second, Lemma 3 establishes that,
if n > n ss
,
there exists a unique trajectory converging to (nss
, x
ss
) following the
dynamics (39) (it is immediate that, if n > nss , there exists no trajectory converging
to (nss
, x
ss
) following the dynamics given by (38), since these imply h > 0). Third,
Lemma 4 provides a complete characterization of equilibrium dynamics when the
transition involves either only innovation or only standardization, followed by a jump
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in either the innovation of standardization rate as the economy reaches (nss
,x
ss
),
but continuous changes in asset values. Fourth, Lemma 5 establishes that (under
the sufficient conditions of the Proposition) there exists no trajectory converging
to (nss
,x
ss
) following the dynamics (40). Finally, Lemma 6 rules out transitional
dynamics in the neighborhood of the BGP in which there is a jump from CASE 3 to
either CASE 1 or CASE 2 or between CASE 1 and CASE 2. These lemmas together
establish local saddle-path stability.
Lemma 2 Suppose n < nss . Then, there exists a unique trajectory attaining {n ss
, x
ss
)
in finite time following the dynamics of CASE 1, (38). This trajectory features
monotonic convergence in n (n > 0).
Proof. Consider the phase diagram depicting the system of differential equa-
tions (38) shown in Figure 4. This system has no zero over the feasible region
["min, 1] x [0,J/(n)] (i-e -> over the region where n 6 [nmin ,l] and x 6 [0)2/ (n)D- ^-n
particular, in the interior of the region [nmin , 1] x [0, y(n)], and hence at (nS3 ,x
ss
),
h > and x | <= X % X in ) > where X in) = [iHp + y (n) - nH (n) < y (n) . The
last inequality follows from Assumption 1. Although whether x ("
ss
) < x(nSS ) 1S in
general ambiguous, the phase diagram shows that there is a unique trajectory (and a
unique initial level of the control variable, x ) converging in finite time to (n
ss
, x
ss
)
In particular, since (nss
,x
ss
) is not a zero of the system (38), the determination of
the converging trajectory can be expressed as an initial value problem with (n^, Xt)
being the boundary (terminal) condition. From the standard result of existence and
uniqueness of solutions for systems of ordinary differential equations, this initial value
problem has a unique solution. Fixing the initial condition n yields a unique solution
for T (the length of the transition) and Xo- The monotonicity of the dynamics of n
ensures that this solution is unique, i.e., there does not exist two solutions (no, T, Xo)
and (no, T", x'o) with T ^T' and Xo 7^ Xo- This argument also proves that convergence
is attained in finite time.
Lemma 3 Suppose no > n ss . Then, there exists a unique trajectory attaining (n ss
, x
ss
)
in finite time following the dynamics of CASE 2, (39). This trajectory features
monotonic convergence (n < and x > 0).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. The dynamical system again has
no zero over the feasible region [nmin , 1] x [0,y (n)]. In particular, for n > n
ss
,
n >
and X > 0. The latter follows from the observation that x ^ <=> Hl ("•) /«l % Pi
34
C/A
Figure 4: Saddle Path, n < nsa
where tt'l (n) < and nL (n
ss
) /pL > p, implying that nL (n) /pL > p for all n > n
ss
.
The phase diagram in Figure 5 shows that there is a unique trajectory converging in
finite time to (n ss
, x
ss
) This trajectory features monotonic dynamics.
The previous two Lemmas together imply our key characterization result.
Lemma 4 There exists equilibrium dynamics with the following characteristics.
If no < n
ss
,
the economy converges in finite time to (nss
, \
ss
) following the system
of differential equations (38), with monotonic convergence in n. Throughout this con-
vergence, VH = pH , Vl < Pi, m = and g = (y (n) — X) /pH . When the economy
reaches (n ss
,x
ss
) , there is a discrete increase in standardization offset by a fall in the
interest rate such that r (nss ) = r' (n ss ) +m (nss ) . Thereafter, Vh = Ph anc^ ^l = ^l-
If Uq > n
ss the economy converges in finite time to (nss ,x
ss
) following the system of
differential equations (39), with monotonic convergence in n and \. Throughout this
convergence, VH < pH) VL = pL , m = (y (n) — \) / {npL ) > and g = 0. When
the economy reaches (nss
, x
ss
) i there is a discrete fall in standardization offset by an
increase in innovation such that y (n
ss
) — x remains constant. Thereafter, Vh = Ph
and Vl = pL .
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 combined with the following obser-
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1.0
n
Figure 5: Saddle Path, n > nss
vations. Suppose we start with n < n ss
,
then the dynamic equilibrium is given by
the system of differential equations (38), so from Lemma 2 until T, we have m — 0.
At T, we reach {nss
,x
ss
) and m jumps from zero to its steady state, mss . This is
offset by an equal jump down in r implying that Vjj does not change (i.e., it remains
at Vh = nH ). Moreover, at T, VL attains its steady state (BGP) value, Vl = fiL .
Note that there is no discontinuity in the asset value Vl, since the change in r and
m are perfectly anticipated, causing a continuous change in the value Vl before the
actual change occurs to reach Vl = ^l exactly at T (the continuity of Vl ensures
that there is no arbitrage opportunity in buying and selling shares of L-sector firms).
Thus at this point, the dynamics switch to those given by the system of differential
equations (40) with both innovation and standardization. Since (nss
, x
ss
) is a zero of
(40), the economy stays at (n ss ,x
ss
) thereafter. The fact that this path satisfies the
transversality condition follows by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
4.
Next, suppose that we start with n > nss . Then the dynamic equilibrium is given
by the system of differential equations (39) and from Lemma 3, until T, g = 0. At
T, investment in standardization and mr fall discretely (the latter declining to mss ),
and investment in innovation and g jumps up (the latter increasing to gss ). There is
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no change in overall investment and thus neither r, nor consumption nor Vj, change
at T. As m jumps down, Vh attains its stead state value, VH — \iH exactly at T (note
that the path of Vh is continuous at T, as the change in m is perfectly anticipated
by investors). As a result, again at T, the dynamics switch to those given by the
system of differential equations (40) with both innovation and standardization. Since
(n ss
,x
s$
) is a zero of (40), the economy stays at (nss
, \
/SS
) thereafter. The fact that
this path satisfies the transversality condition again follows by the same argument..
We next show that transitional dynamics converging to (nss
, x
ss
) cannot feature
both Vh = fJ.H and Vl — Hl since the system (40) is unstable in the neighborhood of
(n",x").
Lemma 5 Suppose n ^ n ss . Then, under the (sufficient) conditions of the Proposi-
tion, there exists no trajectory converging to (nss
,x
ss
) following the dynamical system
(40).
Proof. The proof, which is long, is presented in the next subsection.
Lemmas 2-5 establish that in the neighborhood of (nss
,x
ss
) , we must have either
Vh < fJ-H or ^i < ^L' implying that there is either only innovation or only standard-
ization. However, the results established so far do not rule out "switches" between
different regimes while n t ^ n
ss
,
and thus cycles. Moreover, with such switches, the
equilibrium might also be indeterminate, with multiple paths starting from some ini-
tial n converging to the BGP. Lemma 6 rules out all of these possibilities by showing
that in the neighborhood of the BGP, there cannot be a switch from the dynamics
given by any one of (38), (39) and (40) to one of the other two. (For notational
convenience, in this lemma, we write Vn,t = [J-h *° mean that Vh,v = /% for t' in a
neighborhood of t).
Lemma 6 Consider an equilibrium trajectory in the neighborhood of the BGP, (n3S
, \ ss
Then, there cannot be a switch from any one of (38), (39) and (40) to one of the other
two, i.e., if at t in the neighborhood of (nss
, x
ss
)> we have Vn,tQ — /•*# and Vj,,to = I^l-
then an equilibrium cannot involve Vn,t < /% and/or Vi,t < Hl for t > to! if we have
Vff,t = nH o,nd Vi,tQ < f^L> then an equilibrium cannot involve Vn,t < P-h and/or
Vlj = Ml for t > to; and if we have VHtto < fJ-H and Vl ](o = fiL , then an equilibrium
cannot involve Vn,t = /% and/or Vi <t < \xL for t > to.
Proof. We will prove that if in the neighborhood of (n ss
, ,\
ss
), we have Vn,t — Hh
and VL,ta = Uli ^en an equilibrium cannot involve VH<t = [iH and Vj,,t < Hl f°r
t > to. The other cases are analogous.
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Suppose to obtain a contradiction that this is the case and denote the last instance
where Vi = \ih by T (i.e., Vl,t+e < Pl f°r £ > 0. We need to distinguish two cases.
First, Vi,t' < Hl for all t' > t, and second, there exists T" > t, such that we again
have VLit< = fi£.
Case 1: the fact that Vl# < P>l f°r alii' > t contradicts the hypothesis that the
equilibrium path will converge to the BGP.
Case 2: we write Vl,t as follows:
Vl,t = / exp ( - / r{nv)dv
J
irL (nT ) dr
= / exp I - / r{n v)dv
J
nL (nT ) dr + exp j — / r (nT) dr
J
/zL ,
where the equality exploits the fact that by hypothesis Vl,t' — Ml- Moreover, we also
have, again by hypothesis, that Vl,t — Md which implies
/ exp f - / r{nv)du
J
i\L (nT ) dr = I 1 - exp I - / r (nT ) dr
J
/iL . (41)
Suppose next that n^ > nss . By the instability result in Lemma 5, this implies fir >
and thus nT > nS3 for all r G [T, T"]. But then from Lemma 1, 7T£,(nT ) > 7T£,(nss ) for
all r 6 [T, T']. Moreover, since Vh,t — M# an<^ Vl,t < Mli we a^so nave that for all
r6[r,n
r (nr ) , !E*Jfe) > 2£fit) > f£&3 = r (n-)
,
Mh Ml Ml
where the second inequality again follows from Lemma 1 in view of the fact that
nT > n
ss for all r G [T,T']. But then,
/ exp ( - / r(nv)dv
J
7rL (nr ) dr < / exp I — 7 r(nv)dv j dr
J
TTx, (nss )
< f 1 - exp I - / r{nT )dT
J
j
/iL ,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that r (nr ) < r (nss ) for all r G
[T, T'\. This inequality contradicts (41).
Suppose instead that nT < n
ss
. By the instability result in Lemma 5, nT < and
thus nT < n
ss for all r G [T,T'}. Moreover, by the same reasoning for all r G [T,T'],
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^h^t) > ^H{nss ) and since Vl,t < Ml; m (nr) = 0- Therefore,
\'h,t = / expf-/ {r{nv) + m{nv)) dv
J
irH (nT) dr
exp I - / r(nu)dv
J
7r# (nT ) dr + exp - / r(nT )dT \xH . (42)
But since for all r 6 [T, T'\
r (nT ) = — > -
/% Ms
the first term in (42) is strictly greater than ( 1 — exp [ — ft r (nT ) dr J J fiH and thus
contradicts Vh,t — M#- m
Lemmas 2-6 establish the results of the Proposition. In particular, Lemmas 5 and
6 imply that starting at n t ^ n ss in the neighborhood of the BGP we must have
VH < /iH or VL < fiL . If Vh — Hh and Vl = Ml; either we diverge from the BGP
in view of 5, or we have to switch to a regime where Vjj < fiH or VL < fiL , which is
ruled out by Lemma 6. If we have Vh < Hh or Vi, < Ml 'n the neighborhood of the
BGP, then Lemmas 2-4 imply that there exists a unique path converging to the BGP.
This completes the proof of the Proposition.
6.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We take a linear approximation of the dynamical system (40) around (nss
, x
ss
)
'
£ ~ F
x (x
ss
,n
ss )-(X -X ss ) + Fn(x ss ,n ss)-(n-nss )
A.
2 ~ G
x (X
ss
,
n
ss
) • (X - X
ss
) + Gn (X ss , n ss ) • (n - n»°)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and
p, x _ / v y (n ) ~ Mjg (n)n-xF{x,n) = r{n)-p ,
G(X,n) a (l^)yJ^A- m {n)(l + il-n)^
\ n J nH V Mh
mm
implying that:
Fxix , n) = -L >0,Gx (x,n ) = -(^f)±< .
Solving for the schedules such that, respectively, \ = and n = yields:
X(n)lx=o = y(ji)-tiLm(n)n-fj,H {r(n)-p)
X (n) U=o = V in) - //Lm (n) n - uHm (n)
n
,1-n
with slopes:
,, ,,
Fn (x",n") G„(x",~")
*<"^=° =
-j^^) «"" X-(n)U=. = - 0x(x„„„ ) .
Suppose there were trajectories featuring both innovation and standardization
converging to (nss
, x
ss
) Then, either one or both eigenvalues of the linearized system
would be negative. We show that this is impossible and that under the sufficient con-
ditions of the Proposition both eigenvalues must be positive. Let the two eigenvalues
of the linearized system be denoted by Ai and A2. We know that
Ai + A 2 = Fx (X
ss
,n
ss
) + Gn ix ss ,n ss )
Ai-A 2 = Fx (x
ss
,n°°)-Gn (xa3,nsa)-Fn (xaa,nss)-Gx (xa3,naa).
Claim 1 The following inequality holds
Fn ixss ,nss ) Gn ( X ss ,nss )
F
x (x
s\nss )
<
Gx ixss ,n°°)'
Hence, A
x
• A 2 >
Proof. We need to show that x' {nss ) \ x=o < x' {nss ) |n=o- Define A(n) = x in) \x=o —
X in ) |n=o = pHm (n ) {t~h) ~ Ph (r (n ) — P)- We know that m (n) = for n > n
max >
nss . Thus, at n = nmax we have:
A (nmax ) = -pH (r (n) - p) = -uH (^ - p) <
V Ph 1
by Assumption 1. Next, recall that at nmm = -~^ we have y (n) = H + L, m (n) =
40
H+L f-i- - ±) and r (n) = 3±k. Thus:
A , min v H + L f I 1\, /# + L
e VMff Ml/ V ^l
by Assumption 2. Moreover, we know that nss is unique. Thus, x (^
ss
) lx=o =
x{nSS )\n=o for a unique value of n ss . Then, by the intermediate value theorem,
X (n) \x=o > X (n ) |n=o f°r all n < n
ss and x (n ) \ x=o < X (n ) U=o for all n > n
ss
.
m
Since we know that Ar A2 > 0, showing that Ax + A 2 > establishes that the system
has two positive eigenvalues and is therefore unstable. The condition Xi + A 2 > can
be written as:
X W U= = - Gn (x
s
>
FX (XS
Gx {xss ,n™) Gx (Xss ,n**) l-nj fig
1
(43)
A sufficient condition for (43) to be satisfied is that the locus n = be upward sloping
in a neighborhood of the BGP. Let us first consider the case where p —> 0. Using
y (n) = e [tiith (n) + (1 — n) t\l (n)] and m (n)
tt«(") T L (n)
f*H VL
into x (nji*|n=0-
X (n ) k=o =y(n)-m (n)
n
1-n'/*a + "Ml
= [th («) n] • A (n)
where A (n) = 1 We know that the factor
?t# (n) n is inverted U-shaped, with a maximum at n* > nmin (it corresponds to
the maximum g characterized in Section 2.7). Thus, for n £ [nmin ,n*] a sufficient
condition for x' («)i„=o > is ^^ > 0:
dA n
dn
T^hKn,
dn \ith (n)
1 +
nL {n) e
+
nH (n) n 2 (l - n) \^h (n) pL
kl (n) pH
1 +-
d *l [n
dn \tth (n) J 1 — n
1
For p -* 0, in the BGP we have ^H = ^n and #- (-M2!) = —^tt^t-r ' nH {n) /j„ dn VirH (n) J t irH (n) (l-n)n
T^r^. Thus:c(l-n) ^H
9A n Ml
9n (1 — n) /Lijj
A sufficient condition for x' (n ) |n=o > is then
e-1 1
+ €-- + -
£ 71 € (I — n
e- Mw
Ml
e-1 1
he
e n
e — 1 z/fi
e (1-n) ^
41
1 e-1
e -- - + —, c
n e (1 — n)
Finally, note that in the BGP ^\ = &-n -> ** = ^r?i = (±=%h) : n. Thus,
the sufficient condition become:
1 fl-n,\
+ ( h ) n >0
n
Since this expression is increasing in n, we only need to verify that it is positive at
£-1
Timin- At nm -m we have (^p/i) ' = 1 and the condition becomes:
e-1 1 e-1
+ e - - + — + n > 0. (44)
e n e (1 — n)
Substituting nmin = h/ (1 + /i) yields (28) in the text.
Finally, for n > n*, rewrite the necessary condition as:
x' (n ) U=o _ T« (n ) , 1 &4 1 ,
_ f n
x(n)|n=o 7rff (n) n <9nA \1 ~ n / ^hX (n ) k=o
From equations (16) and (17):
n'H (n) _ 1_ l[y(n)]^ /H\^ l[y(n)]^ / I \ ^' 1
7r# (n) n e e — 1 \ n / e e — 1 \1 — n / ne
Substituting [y (n)}~T
~
— (1 — n) 7 L~ + n'<-H~ into this expression, we have
1 (I-")" 1
<
tt^ (n)
+
1
e (e - 1) i + (_^)i h'-r" *H{n) n
\ 1—n f
This implies that ^§^jb; > 777^ ~i — is sufficient for x' (n) |n=o > 0. Now
1+(T^r) r 'lV
using the fact that in BGP ^44 = ^n, we obtain that A (n) = 1 - ^ + n + e.
Thus, a sufficient condition for x' (n ) |n=o > i s:
£i + f-l+ t ~ 1 +^a 1 i
^
f
" ^ e(l-n) ^ Mt.
__J 1 (A5)l-^ + n.+ e e(«-l) 1+fe) i fc^
The LHS is increasing in n, the RHS is decreasing. Thus, if this condition is satisfied
at n*, it will also be satisfied for higher values of n. Since n* > 1/2 (see (32)), it can
be verified that condition (45) is always satisfied when (44) holds. In sum, (44) is suf-
ficient to prove that the dynamical system with both innovation and standardization
42
is locally unstable in the limit where p — 0. By continuity, the same result applies
for p < p for some p > sufficiently small.
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